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Introduction 
It seems very reasonable to link the ideas of Rawls on public reason and related 
notions with the idea of deliberative democracy. Apart from the fact that in recent 
writings Rawls himself makes the connection explicitly,1 we can ask whether any real 
compulsion to attach ‘deliberation’ and ‘democracy’ could have arisen at all without 
powerful contemporary forebears – Rawls and Habermas above all – emphasizing 
dialogical approaches to political principles and institutions.2 Rawls’ device of the 
original position famously models an ideal dialogue on principles of justice; Cohen’s 
influential deliberative model3 clearly springs directly from these Rawlsian roots. The 
original position provides a means to assess different interpretations of social justice, 
while deliberative democracy brings together different preferences in order to subject 
them to the test of public and open scrutiny. One can agree that these chains of influence 
are real and still question fundamentally whether some of the links are strong enough to 
sustain them. Benhabib4 pursues this task briefly, noting among other things that Rawls’ 
idea of public reason is about limits on how to reason rather than a process of actual 
reasoning in public. But it is worth paying closer attention to the issue in order to draw 
out (a) fundamental reasons why the Rawlsian project as Rawls presents it cannot be 
genuinely deliberative, and (b) the light that can be thrown on deliberative models of 
democracy by looking at basic Rawlsian categories in new ways. 
This chapter offers arguments to support the following conjectures: (1) despite 
claims by Rawls and some commentators, Rawls is not and cannot be a deliberative 
democrat; the evidence for this can be gleaned by focussing on various interpretations of 
the structure of Rawls’ arguments in A Theory of Justice (1972) and Political Liberalism 
(1993) respectively; and (2) if we ask more directly how the ideal dialogue of the original 
position might be approximated in real-world conditions, we can reach suggestive 
conclusions about institutions and deliberative democracy radically different from those 
reached by Rawls himself. 
Layered ambiguities: Rawls on public reason 
Rawls’ account of ‘public reason’ has been cited as a ‘major statement’ of the ‘idea 
of deliberative democracy’, one which tries to work out ‘the philosophical details of 
political justification based on deliberation and public reason’.5 Rawls himself has 
written that public reason as he understands it is one vital ingredient of ‘deliberative 
democracy’.6 However, as I shall argue, this link cannot be sustained; public reason and 
deliberation are quite different things. Rawls’ vision is more accurately seen as non-
deliberative – even anti-deliberative – unless we stretch the meaning of deliberation well 
beyond what any of the major deliberative theorists7 intend it to mean. 
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These claims require a clear distinction between deliberative and non-deliberative 
conceptions of democracy (to put it in black-and-white terms). Alas, we are not helped in 
this task by the stipulative and contestable nature of the definitions of deliberative 
democracy offered by key theorists. It rapidly becomes clear that ‘deliberative 
democracy’ means many things. Authors like Cohen,8 Dryzek,9 Gutmann and 
Thompson10 and Fishkin11define and to varying degrees elaborate divergent conceptions 
of deliberative democracy. Some see it as discussion over issues in state forums, others in 
non-state contexts; some as a vital adjunct to exiting democratic practices like voting, 
others as elevating ‘talk’ well above traditional mechanisms. Even in reasonably full 
conceptions of democracy that are not tagged as deliberative or which on the face of it do 
not emphasize deliberation, reason-giving and political dialogue (such as that of Dahl12 it 
is clear that deliberation of various types is envisaged and valued. However, it is not the 
raw presence of deliberation in a conception of democracy (or in a real system reflective 
the features of such a conception), but rather its status and role that defines the 
deliberative/non-deliberative boundary.13 
Can we set out reasonable defining features of deliberative conceptions despite these 
understandable grey areas?14 I believe so, if we specify a conception of democracy as 
‘deliberative’ if it stipulates that (a) voting must be preceded by formal and actual 
deliberation among representative citizens, (b) there be evidence of successful public 
facilitation of free deliberation in a range of non-state civil forums, (c) deliberation of the 
first sort in particular must have a determinate impact on the shape of the final outcome, 
such that (for example) the outcome can be justified and accounted for in terms of themes 
or arguments that were prominent in the deliberative process concerned, and (d) that the 
formal deliberations in particular satisfied minimum procedural standards of equal 
respect and inclusiveness. 
I will (briefly) explore key parts of Rawls’ account in order to show how in fact it 
undermines even this baseline vision of deliberative democracy. This matters because the 
influence of Rawls on the world of political ideas is understandably huge given his 
achievements, and his impact on real institutional design and decision-making is not 
negligible. 
For Rawls, ‘public reason’ is either a set of reasons or a way of reasoning (it makes 
a real difference which it is – this is the first significant ambiguity) necessary to the 
adequacy of legislative or constitutional outcomes on important political questions. In 
Rawls’ view of ‘public reason’, so central to his project in Political Liberalism, who gets 
to ‘reason’, and where and how? Initially, it is everyone: ‘Public reason is characteristic 
of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal 
citizenship’.15 But in fact Rawls sees it as applying in particular to a more narrowly 
circumscribed set of issues and group of actors. On this view, it is not something that all 
need engage or indulge in, at least not constantly or compulsorily – it is primarily 
something that applies to, and should act as a constraint upon, judges, elected politicians, 
government officials and candidates for political office.16 
Public reason is also seen by Rawls as applying not to ‘political’ questions generally, 
but to ‘constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice’; it has to do with higher, 
constitutional arrangements rather than more mundane, within-politics issues. It is 
distinguished from the ‘non-public’ reasons people offer for the political stances they 
adopt on a variety of issues within the institutions in civil society, such as churches, 
universities, etc.17 
So when we reason in public on fundamental issues, we must reason in a certain 
way, by accepting certain constraints. But, Rawls asks – taking the broad view of who 
should honour public reason’s constraints – ‘why should citizens in discussing and voting 
on the most fundamental political questions honour the limits of public reason?’.18 His 
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reply, from within ‘political liberalism’, is that ‘our exercise of political power is proper 
and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational’.19 
Let us break this key argument down into its constituent parts: 
A Reasonable and rational people, aware of pluralism … 
B will find certain principles/ideals acceptable to them … 
C therefore they will endorse a constitution which embodies these principles/ideals. 
D If political power is exercised in accordance with this constitution … 
E then political power is exercised legitimately. 
I have suggested that deliberative democracy ultimately involves (among other 
things) actual public or semi-public forums discussing and debating key issues. Referring 
to public reason seemingly implies a process of actual reasoning (discussing, debating, in 
a certain way in a variety of actual settings). But note that the location of ‘public reason’ 
in the above schema is in points A – C, and that this is precisely where reasoning is a 
solitary, inward-looking, thoughtful matter; public decision-making only comes into the 
equation in point D – E. The affirmation or endorsement of the principles and ideals in B 
is done by individuals thinking/’reasoning’ alone, not together. Affirmation is a solitary 
affair, even involving citizens abstracting in their minds away from the content of the 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ they hold in their non-public lives.20  
I pointed out above the ambiguity in the term ‘reason’ – an ambiguity that Rawls 
does little to clear up in his own use of the notion. To reason with another is to talk with 
them with an eye to convincing them rationally of one’s viewpoint. But clearly one can 
also ‘reason’ in one’s mind, perhaps by conducting an internal dialogue with imaginary 
others. The above comments suggest that it is the latter interpretation that most clearly 
captures the sense of the term in Rawls’ schema. 
In comments on the public’s role in applying public reason to specific cases in the 
1997 edition of Political Liberalism (reproduced in 1997a for present purposes), Rawls 
writes that: ‘For how to think about a kind of case depends not on general considerations 
alone but on our formulating relevant political values we may not have imagined before 
we reflect about particular instances’.21 Think, imagine, reflect – these are ‘internal 
dialogue’ terms, not injunctions to real public discussion. Further, in the essay ‘The Idea 
of Public Reason Revisited’, Rawls mentions that on those occasions when they must 
exercise distinctively public reason citizens should ‘ask themselves’ what provisions it 
would be reasonable to enact; and, in considering ‘the idea of political legitimacy based 
on the criterion of reciprocity’ (the latter a, possibly the, crucial ingredient of public 
reason), Rawls writes that: ‘our exercise of political power is proper only when we 
sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to 
state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that 
other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons’.22 The added italics highlight 
the conditional, non-discursive – non-deliberative – character of Rawls’ thinking here. 
One thing these comments do is drive a wedge between ‘public reason’ and (actual) 
deliberation. 
It appears, then, that ‘public reason’ for Rawls is not an injunction actually to reason 
(deliberate, debate) in public with fellow citizens. Rather, it appears to be about content – 
a set of guidelines about how to think about fundamental issues in the ‘public political 
forum’. Indeed, Rawls notes that a central part of the ‘structure’ of public reason is ‘its 
content as given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice’.23 So on this 
view public reason is a ‘thing’ rather than a process, something ‘given’ rather than 
created or practiced. And if that is the case, no actual deliberation takes place. 
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We can search for the reasons for this by digging a little deeper into a related 
ambiguity: is the ‘content’ of public reason the product of the original position, or could 
it acceptably be derived from some other ‘reasonable political conception of justice’?  
On one reading of Political Liberalism the former answer seems correct. The basis 
for the content of public reason is provided by the original position: 
… the guidelines of inquiry of public reason, as well as its principle of 
legitimacy, have the same basis as the substantive principles of justice. 
This means in justice as fairness that the parties in the original position, in 
adopting principles of justice for the basic structure, must also adopt 
guidelines and criteria of public reason for applying those norms.24 
On this interpretation the respective structures of the arguments in A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism ‘meet’ in the sense that the subject of the ‘overlapping 
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ is itself the conception of ‘justice as 
fairness’. 
However, more often Rawls notes that there may be a number of reasonable political 
conceptions – justice as fairness is one among various possible political conceptions of 
justice. Here, different political conceptions of justice will contain criteria that others will 
reasonably be able to endorse along with us.25 Each of these conceptions can properly be 
deployed in the public political forum, since (above all) each will accept reciprocity as its 
core principle and thereby be a reasonable focus for an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, in Rawls’ terms. There are ‘different liberalisms’26 
so there will be different versions; justice as fairness is ‘just one’ view27 which Rawls 
himself prefers.28 Clearly Rawls does not imagine these different political conceptions 
differing too much from each other – reciprocity qualifies each of them, and each 
includes a conception of rights, priorities and means directly reminiscent of the two 
principles of justice in justice as fairness. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
for Rawls justice as fairness is the ‘default mode’ political conception for all who fail to 
(make the mental effort to) come up with their own. 
It seems clear, then, that something akin to the original position is needed to provide 
a reasonable political conception of justice even if that conception (in line with the 
second interpretation, above) is not necessarily Rawls’ preferred one of justice as 
fairness. And, of course, the original position is a purely hypothetical device: one can at 
any time ‘simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in 
accordance with the appropriate restrictions’.29 It is a place in which deliberation is ideal 
and general and inclusive; therefore it cannot be an actual place. Recall, too, that we 
reach the favoured conception of the original position by a process of ‘reflective 
equilibrium’. As discussed in A Theory of Justice, reflective equilibrium is a solitary 
thought process, engaged in (ideally) by all citizens on their own, conducted in order to 
reach a specific conception of an initial situation which accords with our considered 
convictions about the content of justice.  
One strength – from Rawls’ point of view, at least – of the conception of justice 
embodied in the specification of the original position is that each individual need not in 
fact engage in the process of seeking reflective equilibrium; all we need to know is that 
reasonable and rational people would reach similar conclusions, if they did so engage. So 
even solitary ‘deliberation’ is not necessary; the outcome is fixed (even given some 
flexibility as represented in the second interpretation), with no process of actual 
reasoning of any sort necessarily being involved. Again, this may be called ‘public 
reason’, but it is not open-ended, explicit reasoning or actual public deliberation. The 
metaphor of the original position – non-deliberative, hypothetical – runs through the 
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structure of the argument in Political Liberalism and later statements on public reason 
too. 
Despite the (inevitable, fixed) non-deliberative origins of public reason, Rawls does 
want citizens to engage with fundamental political questions: 
As to whom public reason applies, we say that it applies to citizens when 
they engage in political advocacy in the public forum, in political 
campaigns for example and when they vote on those fundamental 
questions. It always applies to public and government officers in official 
forums, in their debates and votes on the floor of the legislature. Public 
reason applies especially to the judiciary in its decisions and as the 
institutional exemplar of public reason.30 
Note, first, that citizens must adopt the content of public reason in certain instances 
of their voting in particular, but it is highly ambiguous as to which instances. On 
fundamental political questions, citizens must vote according to canons of public reason: 
‘ … public reason with its duty of civility gives a view about voting on fundamental 
questions is some ways reminiscent of Rousseau’s Social Contract. He saw voting as 
ideally expressing our opinion as to which of the alternatives best advances the common 
good’31 … ‘citizens and legislators may properly vote their more comprehensive views 
when constitutional essentials and basic justice are not at stake’32 But where is the neat 
dividing line between the fundamental political and the non-fundamental political (Rawls 
implies rather than states the existence of the second category)? 
So, my argument is that the basis of public reason in the (purely hypothetical) 
original position, its related notion of the (solitary) seeking of reflective equilibrium, and 
the (solitary, mental) assessments by citizens as to the status of this vote (and 
consequently the motivation they should bring to it), render public reason a thoroughly 
non-deliberative notion. Or, if it chimes at all with the work of deliberative democrats, it 
can only be in the unhelpful sense of advocating solitary, not actual and effective, 
deliberation.33 No doubt the larger Rawlsian argument welcomes citizens deliberating 
with each other and being attentive to the deliberations of (e.g.) representatives. The 
point, however, is that the status this view accords to deliberation does not match what 
we would need to see to regard the conception as genuinely ‘deliberative’. Rawls’ views, 
in short, provide an argument which is virtually diametrically opposed to dominant 
visions of deliberative democracy, each of which stresses the importance of actual 
deliberation whatever the specific forums or sites are favoured. 
The Rawlsian mirror 
Arguably, the reason why Bohman and Rehg, along with Rawls himself, can readily 
characterize public reason as deliberative democracy has a good deal to do with the fact 
that Rawls’ theory has changed fundamentally since A Theory of Justice. This, of course, 
is a huge topic, and not one I wish to enter into here in any detail. But in general terms 
public reason and the seeking of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines sounds like a more worldly, engaged, political project (and so has Rawls 
characterized it). In A Theory of Justice, the device of the four-stage sequence by which 
the ‘veils’ are gradually lifted takes us through a process whereby we descend from 
imaginary contexts to real world politics. Political Liberalism by way of contrast seems 
to give us the real political world from the start, with irreducible pluralism of religious 
and other comprehensive doctrines, the possibility of different reasonable conceptions of 
justice, and so on. This sense is reinforced by the fact that the argumentative devices 
which distance the process of reaching compelling principles of justice in A Theory of 
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Justice – the original position above all – are downgraded in the later work, though their 
presence in it is a haunting one, as I have tried too briefly to indicate above. 
I want to suggest, however, that the arguments of Political Liberalism can properly 
be interpreted as the mirror image of those of A Theory of Justice. The architectural 
structure of the early work operates as a metaphor for the structure of the later work and 
the elements which comprise it. This conjecture in itself, if accurate, cannot alone 
account for the unworldliness, especially the absence of (the need or desire for) actual 
deliberation, in the writings on public reason and related concepts, but surely it can go 
some considerable way in that direction.  
By examining features of the arguments in the early and later books, we can draw 
links between key concepts within and across the arguments of the two books. Thus, we 
being with the individual citizen in Story A, who has his or her considered convictions 
and takes these into the device of representation known as the original position. By a 
process of reflective equilibrium, our citizen brings his or her considered convictions into 
line with the demands of justice as modelled by the structure of choice behind the veil of 
ignorance. Thus our citizen reaches agreement on the two principles of justice in the 
conception known as justice as fairness. In Story B, the citizen is identified with his or 
her comprehensive doctrine – and hopefully a reasonable comprehensive doctrine – 
which will shape and inform most of the political arguments our citizen will make, most 
of the time. However, when our citizen enters the public political forum – or, more 
accurately, has to think through reasonable solutions to fundamental questions that he or 
she may be called to vote upon – he or she must accept the constraints of public reason. 
By deploying a political conception of justice which satisfies public reason guidelines, 
our citizen can locate grounds on a given issue that he or she could reasonably expect 
others to reasonably agree with – an overlapping consensus. 
By positing the interpretive device of the mirror I am suggesting that each step in 
each of these ‘stories’ can be linked to equivalent steps in the other; that is, there are 
equivalent concepts in each story which, so to speak, do the same work within the 
respective arguments. The citizen with his or her considered convictions is the citizen 
enfolded in his or her (reasonable) comprehensive doctrine. The citizen in the public 
political forum, like the citizen in the original position, is in a context where only certain 
sorts of arguments about courses of action are appropriate or acceptable. Public reason is 
an internal, mental process of finding good and right reasons for believing in a 
conception of justice and its implications for given issues; reflective equilibrium is 
likewise. And what public reason produces is a political conception of justice which 
(ideally) can act as the focus for an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, just as justice as fairness as one, favoured such conception, would be agreed by 
all engaged in the relevant processes.  
In short, the argument in Political Liberalism is, at a deeper level, the mirror image 
of the argument of A Theory of Justice.34 We have seen already how little actual 
deliberation takes place within the story told in Rawls’ later work. Considering how that 
work represents a metaphorical reconstruction of the early work reinforces our suspicions 
that there is nothing here that deliberative democrats can call their own.35 It may be 
‘political not metaphysical’ on the surface; beneath that, the metaphysical is still in the 
driving seat. 
The more things change … 
In his much-cited essay ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’ Cohen36 adopts 
the very same architecture I have discussed above as the template for a theory of 
deliberative democracy. That at least is my interpretation.37 Cohen attempts to distance 
himself from the Rawlsian framework just as he deploys it. To that extent, his intention is 
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to construct a regulative principle or ideal of deliberation that can be approximated as far 
as possible in practice. His is one effort to move from a Rawlsian framework to a 
practical ideal of deliberative democracy; Rawls’ own efforts in Political Liberalism and 
‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ represent another. These particular efforts do not, I 
argue, get us far. The non-deliberative roots of the argumentative structure get in the 
way; the Rawlsian metaphor prevents the argument metamorphosing into something else 
– like a practical conception of deliberative democracy.  
Ironically enough, this point can be illustrated by focusing on differences (e.g. in 
terminology) or adaptations of the initial Rawlsian framework in the course of these 
efforts to move more squarely into the realm of democratic theory. Clearly, someone 
could protest that my discussion so far has underestimated the real changes and 
adaptations of the Rawlsian framework from the 1970s to the 1990s. My argument here, 
in short, is that to the extent that he shifts away from the framework in A Theory of 
Justice Rawls is forced to make new assumptions about citizens in particular; this is done 
apparently to render the conception more practical in political terms. By contrast, I would 
argue that it is done in order to retain control of, or certainty about, the outcomes of 
‘deliberations’ focused on justice – which in turn further undermines the deliberative 
claims of the project. Things are changed so that they might remain the same; public 
reason is not the original position, but it is different in ways that ensure the ultimate 
product and effect is the same.  
By way of illustration, consider the accounts of (a) motivation, (b) the wide view of 
public reason, (c) civility and (d) the normalizing of citizens in Rawls’ discussion of 
public reason. Like Cohen,38 who stipulates that citizens will be motivated to seek the 
common good in deliberations, the later Rawls stipulates that people must ‘sincerely vote 
in accordance with the idea of public reason’.39 Just as judges cannot simply give their 
own opinions in difficult cases, citizens must not on fundamental political questions 
simply invoke their comprehensive doctrine: ‘From the point of view of public reason, 
citizens must vote for the ordering of political values they sincerely think the most 
reasonable. Otherwise they fail to exercise political power in ways that satisfy the 
criterion of reciprocity’.40 Now, the idea in the original position that citizens (or to-be-
citizens) were self-interested was surely a more practical assumption for building real-
world institutions. There are dangers in letting political legitimacy rests so strongly on 
hopes of citizens voting with certain motivations uppermost in their minds.41 But the fact 
is that, having loosened the reigns on his structure to some extent, Rawls has had to 
tighten his motivational assumptions/stipulations in an unrealistic manner in order to 
continue to make justice a likely achievement in the world of Political Liberalism. 
Similarly, in the late 1990s Rawls relented somewhat on the question of whether 
views from people’s comprehensive doctrines could rightly be invoked in public political 
debate on fundamental questions. On ‘the wide view of public reason’, citizens can now 
invoke elements of their comprehensive doctrines with the proviso that backing for what 
they invoke from within a political conception of justice is forthcoming in due course.42 
Among other things, this shift can be interpreted as partial compensation for the loss of 
what in the original position was the representation of all generations behind the veil of 
ignorance. If, for example, the views of future generations are part of the simulated 
deliberations in the original position, new ideas about what justice might involve can be 
‘on the table’. The menu of topics and possibilities will not be restricted to what one 
generation alone is capable of thinking. The wide view of public reason cannot capture 
what is lost here, but it can go part way in that new ideas from (e.g.) newly emergent 
ideologies like environmentalism can more readily reach the public political forum. 
The ‘duty of civility’ has a prominent place in later work on similar grounds, too. In 
the original position, civility was built into the structure – if all are effectively the same, 
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with the same views, there is hardly anyone to be (or to imagine being) uncivil to. Having 
loosened his grip on the derivation (and the doing) of justice, however, Rawls needs to 
invoke this duty, not to add something new to the mix but to restore what was lost on 
moving to the Political Liberalism framework. Without a duty of civility, citizens could 
easily refuse to act civilly, saying ‘accept my view or be damned’ rather than ‘fulfil their 
duty of civility’ by explaining their positions in the appropriate way.43 
Finally, Political Liberalism still gives us a ‘normalized’ citizen, even if it is not the 
severely ironed out creature that inhabits the original position. People will be different, 
with different comprehensive views which together provide an irreducible plurality of 
reasons and ways of reasoning about issues. Rawls denies that his project of public 
reason ‘normalizes’ people so that they are effectively the same on a philosophical view. 
Instead, he writes, ‘Accounts of human nature we put aside and rely on a political 
conception of persons as citizens instead’. But the trick is in the latter – ‘citizens’ must 
do and be certain things, all the same, for justice to be done in the world of Political 
Liberalism. The very next sentence in ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ is: ‘As I 
have stressed throughout, it is central to political liberalism that free and equal citizens 
affirm both a comprehensive doctrine and a political conception’.44 
So, apparently genuine and significant changes in key assumptions from the early to 
the later Rawlsian frameworks are in fact better seen as devices to retain or restore the 
certainty, and control by the theorist, of his own creation. I have noted this aspect of 
Rawls’ work in order to highlight the underlying commonality regardless of whether we 
consider surface continuity or change in Rawls’ journey to (as he sees it) deliberative 
democracy. 
Forward to the origins? 
The ‘deliberative model of democracy’ is surely entering its endgame period. 
Fragmentation characterizes the theory, whether it be (for example) differences over 
whether deliberative forums ought to be governmental or non-governmental, what 
standards for discussion and debate are regarded as appropriate, the extent to which 
inclusion and consensus are central goals, etc.45 I do not seek to unify perspectives, 
necessarily– to do that, for a start, we would need to address the theory of democracy, not 
deliberative democracy.46 Rather, I ask whether taking a quite different view of the 
Rawlsian project and deliberative democracy can illuminate the fragmentation and 
confusion attending the latter.  
One can understand why Rawls himself does not in the end make as many 
significant changes to his initial framework as is often supposed – or so I have argued. 
The same goes for the extent to which the Rawlsian framing of questions in political 
theory has, and continues to, set the agenda for others.47 In seeking to step outside the 
bulk of that framework while nonetheless toying with one key element of it, I am saying 
nothing to diminish the sheer weight of the intellectual achievement of Rawls. I am, with 
due modesty, suggesting that we are not forced to accept that the building blocks of 
theory need be assembled in the way the master has done it. And with that I proceed ‘to 
stretch fantasy too far’.48  
I want to ask – with self-conscious naivety – what it might mean to attempt to 
approximate the terms and features of the original position in practice. If we (a) insist on 
actual spoken deliberation in actual deliberative forums, (b) do not worry about keeping 
‘control’ of processes and outcomes in the way I have suggested Rawls does, but (c) try 
to retain where possible some real sense of both the realistic and the positive features of 
the original position, can we illuminate the subject of deliberative democracy? 
The central conditions and descriptive features of the original position are the 
assumption that all present act in their self-interest and the inducement of impartiality 
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through the imposition of ignorance on the parties via the device of the veil of ignorance. 
Let us retain the self-interest assumption for what follows. The key positive features of 
the original position from a democratic perspective are: 
- generality: the outcomes reached will have general applicability across the political 
community for whom the original position is acting as a device of representation 
- inclusiveness: all interests are ‘there’, represented in the ‘deliberations’, including 
multiple generations 
- impartiality: all can fully and equally endorse the fairness of the outcomes 
- productivity: it unfailingly produces an outcome of the above sort; stalemate is not an 
option 
- the face-to-face character of the ‘deliberations’. 
We might use these features as regulative principles for the design of real world 
deliberative institutions or contexts. But let us be very clear on the extent to which, and 
the ways in which, the realization of each of these principles is rendered inaccessible by 
the simple transfer of focus from the hypothetical to the real deliberative context. We 
stand to lose generality to the extent that the outcomes will have applicability only to 
living generations and to the political community that is (in some plausible respect) 
present in the deliberations. We stand to lose inclusiveness in similar respects – the 
interests of future (and past) generations will not/cannot be included, a more delimited 
territorial community will form the basis of the deliberative group, and the possibility of 
including non-human interests to move toward a ‘democracy of the affected’49 greatly 
diminishes. And the move to actual spoken discourse with differentiated, gendered, 
accented (etc.) others means differentiated inclusion for different styles of discourse, 
appearance and so forth. Impartiality disappears to the same extent through the limited 
range of interests now effectively represented in the dialogue and the fact that the 
‘enforced’ ignorance-based impartiality of the original position is now replaced by a 
partiality born of particular, incomplete knowledge of self and society. And the delightful 
productivity of the ideal dialogue, which guarantees an outcome, and a thoroughly 
legitimate one at that, is lost to the degree that some mechanism(s) – keep talking until 
you all agree? take a vote and respect simple majority views? – has to be imported, and 
no decision mechanism exists which is universally acceptable on all grounds that count.  
I have suggested that Rawls himself reinstates the features and outcomes of the lost 
hypothetical dialogue by restating the hypothetical in the guise of the real. This is not an 
option for us. Keeping an eye on the regulative principles arising from the original 
position, what institutional and contextual features for a democratic structure built around 
actual, spoken deliberation could we propose? 
I will begin with inclusiveness, as this helps to establish the context for key features 
under other headings. Clearly everyone cannot be included in a face-to-face fashion in 
one deliberative forum. So the device of representation becomes critical. Arguably the 
best way to ensure a fair ‘presence’ for all in an indirect way is through the use of 
random sampling of the population to produce a representative body to do the 
deliberating on behalf of all. In this respect, something like Fishkin’s deliberative polls 
suggest themselves.50 Any delineated population can be randomly sampled, from the 
local to the global, so the move from the original position’s total inclusiveness to our 
partial exclusion need not bring in tight national or other territorial exclusions. 
Now, generality too is a principle served by random sampling to produce a 
representative forum. If the deliberating body is (scientifically) drawn from the whole 
(relevant) population, then we can have some confidence in its outcomes reflecting 
general concerns across that population. Allied to the psychological effects of having to 
give reasons to fellow deliberators that they can accept the premises of, if not the reasons 
themselves, this derivation of the forum is likely to foster generality. Clearly, we are now 
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dealing with various forms and degrees of partiality rather than an easy impartiality. But 
again a forum derived in the way discussed will lessen the extent to which partial 
outcomes are lopsidedly or unacceptably partial. 
So, something like a deliberative poll à la Fishkin may be seen as the most 
defensible real-world equivalent of an original position in the sense of attempting to 
replicate where possible desirable and democratic features of the latter. But – and this is 
where the speculations start to get more interesting – there are other, additional 
institutional devices which we can link to the deliberative poll in order to attempt to pick 
up further features in line with the regulative principles identified. In particular, a 
dynamic civil society characterized by a strong culture of freedom of movement and 
expression is absolutely critical to this skeletal vision. Primarily this is because in the 
original position there is no problem of agenda-setting: because all people of all 
generations are ‘there’, all issues and all ways of looking at issues are there too. A real 
deliberative poll, by contrast (to say the least), must have its agenda set for it. A 
continuous one, like that envisaged here and unlike that deployed by Fishkin and 
colleagues, requires continuous agenda-setting and continuous pressure to look at new 
issues, and at old issues in new ways (impartiality and generality too are fostered: 
impartiality through ignorance can be substituted by a ‘higher’ (or ‘reflective’) partiality 
born of knowledge of many and varied partial perspectives). This might broadly be 
achieved by civil society as I have very broadly characterized its ideal features, with the 
important addition of formal means of agenda-setting stipulating appropriate use of a 
device such as the citizens’ initiative. Even the interests of future generations might then 
feature in real-world debates; if organized interests in civil society press the case for 
considering the future in present decisions, some small but significant part of that effect 
of the veil of ignorance might be recaptured. 
The possibility of stalemate rears its head, of course, in reality. Here, we need 
further, familiar devices in order to hold on to something of the substance of the relevant 
regulative principle. Voting according to rules that are broadly acceptable – itself a topic 
akin to a can of worms, but I say no more on it here – is vital if the real world equivalent 
to the ideal deliberative forum is to be reasonably productive in the sense I use the term 
here. I refer here to voting in the deliberative-representative forum itself; but much more 
broadly than that, we need citizens who have the right to vote for further representative 
bodies which can in a more formal way play an agenda-setting and implementational 
role. The latter are required because of the danger of randomly selected representatives 
being insulated from popular pressures in ways that undermine key regulative principles 
in practice. 
This sketch is all too brief – barely a beginning, let alone an end. It is not meant to 
be more than suggestive. What it does suggest is that, if one were minded to replicate as 
far as possible the assumptions and features of the original position in the real world, one 
would have to produce a vision that, in terms of institutions at least, provided for a mix of 
mechanisms of agenda-setting, deliberation and decision-making, variously broad and 
narrow and formal and informal. More specifically, as I have hinted, a literally 
representative deliberative forum with real decision-making authority would need to be 
located in a larger matrix of institutions including elected assemblies, and free and open 
civil society, the device of the initiative, and so on. On one side, this begins to look like a 
list of (mostly) familiar democratic institutions. On another, it looks like a radical re-
visioning of democracy. Either way, it is a democratic vision, subject to change and 
uncertain outcomes. And it is arguably its democratic character which differentiates it 
from the contrasting vision in Rawls’ Political Liberalism of how his early theory can be 
transformed into a vision of ‘deliberative democracy’. 
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